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Process safety starts at the conceptual phase and continues throughout the entire life cycle of an 
asset.  From process selection to de-commissioning, various process safety elements govern the 
safety and reliability of the total system.  Contractors play a crucial role in project execution 
including detailed design, technology selection, plant layout, commissioning, start-up, and further 
expansion, modification and maintenance activities.  The interface/interaction of the contractor 
with the operator/owner often defines the importance of process safety throughout this life cycle. 
Undoubtedly, these are the most critical phases of a plant life cycle which could trigger an 
unexpected or uncontrolled situation leading to a catastrophic incident. This paper discusses the 
impact of the contractors’ role during major process safety events including the Phillips explosion 
in Pasadena (1989), Sonat vessel failure (1998), Texas City Refinery explosion (2005), T2 
Laboratories explosion (2007) and a few others.  Lessons from past incidents are highlighted and 
an in-depth analysis is conducted to identify essential process safety components for different 
groups of contractors and for the different phases of projects.  Different aspects of process safety 
functional elements are presented and discussed for both greenfield and brownfield projects.  A 
Comprehensive understanding of process safety and risk management is required by all levels of 
contractors to ensure risk-based decision making and hazard mitigation.  Besides the process safety 
expertise needed by the contractors, the necessity of having a consistent and harmonized 
interaction between the operators/owners and the contractors is also emphasized. 
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Contractors are an integral part of the modern industrial era due to their role in plant/platform 
design, construction, commissioning and maintenance. They play a very crucial role in managing 
risk throughout the plant life cycle and the engineering and design phases are undoubtedly the 
most crucial stages for incorporating process safety concepts. The choices made during the design 
phase impact everything in the future from operations to modifications and finally 
decommissioning. A single flaw during the design phase, could be carried throughout the plant life 
cycle and with some unfavorable conditions, may eventually cause a catastrophic incident. 
 
In the first section, statistical analyses and incident case studies are presented to demonstrate the 
involvement of the contractors. The investigation clearly shows the need to engage the contractors 
to build awareness in both process and personnel safety. In the following section, a life cycle based 
approach is discussed where different process safety functional elements are identified for specific 
design tasks and phases. So far, separate responsibilities have been identified and discussed for the 
owners and the contractors. However, for best results, both parties need to work together to build 
a healthy interface with common expectations and understanding in terms of achieving safety goals. 
The owners and the contractors share some common responsibilities for establishing a harmonized 
approach to ensure process safety standards. Creating a common baseline of understanding in 
process safety is the prerequisite for achieving that goal. The third and final section of this article 
provides a discussion on existing practices and current initiatives to build process safety 
competency programs for contractors especially for the design engineers. Six learning modules 
have been identified with appropriate process safety functional elements to allow effective 
integration of process safety during the engineering and design phases. 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND INCIDENT CASE STUDIES  
 
Statistical Analysis of Incidents 
 
From 2011 to 2014, a total of 2,808 contractors were killed at work in the US accounting for 15% 
of the total fatal occupational injuries. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) observed that fatal work injuries involving contractors accounted for 17% of all fatal 
work injuries in 2014 [1]. Starting from 2011, the U.S. Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 
(CFOI) began capturing both the fatalities in the firm that are directly employing and the firm that 
contracted. CFOI is a sub-branch of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)i. According to the data 
published by CFOI, Figure 1 shows the number and percentageii of fatalities of contractors versus 
employees.  
 
The percentage of the contractor fatality increased from 12% to 17% from 2011 to 2014. Also, if 
we closely look at the data for chemical manufacturing, the percentage of fatal occupational 
injuries grows to 22% for the contractors (Figure 2) and for petroleum refineries, the percentage is 
as high as 67% (Figure 3). Even though the data provided in Figures 2 and 3 do not represent the 
complete statistical data set, they do indicate that the chemical process industries need to take more 
                                                     
i The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is a unit of United States Department of Labor and it serves as a principal agency for the 
U.S. Federal Statistical system. 
ii Data Sources: Retrieved from BLS-Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities, http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm 
- Miscellaneous CFOI data table- All worker profile, 2003-2014 
- Miscellaneous CFOI data table- Fatal occupational injuries incurred by contracted workers, 2011-2014 






















Over the past few decades, the energy and chemical industries have witnessed a significant number 
of catastrophic incidents, many of which involved contractors. Basic understanding of process 
safety issues could have prevented the incidents or minimized the consequences. Some of the 
Figure 1. Comparison of fatality numbers/percentage for contractors and other employees (2011-2014) 
Figure 2. Comparison of fatalities of the contractors 
and other employees from 2011 to 2014 in the 
Chemical Manufacturing Industry. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of fatalities of the contractors 
and other employees from 2011 to 2014 in the 
Petroleum Refineries. 
major incidents involving contractors in different phases of the plants’ life cycle are listed and 
discussed in Table 1.  
Table 1: List of Major Incidents 
 






Flammable process gases released and exploded 
during regular maintenance operations on one of 
the plant's polyethylene reactors. The incident 
caused 24 deaths (20 Phillips employees and 4 
contractors) and 132 injuries [2] 
1. Air hoses were connected backwards which 
automatically opened the valve  
2. The lockout device that prevented someone 
from opening a valve was removed 
 Lack of process hazard analysis 
 Lack of human factors 
consideration in design 
 Inadequate operating and 
isolation procedures 
 Lack of combustible gas 
detection system 
 Inadequate ventilation systems 
and pressure relief system 
 Inappropriate facility siting 





July 5, 1990 
Wastewater tank exploded during restart of a 
compressor. The nitrogen purge was reduced 
significantly during maintenance and a 
temporary oxygen analyzer failed to detect 
oxygen buildup as it was in a dead zone.  
The explosion killed 17 people (5 employees 
and 12 contractors) and caused 5 injuries [3] [4] 
 Inadequate hazard analysis and 
safety measures during non-
routine operations 
 Lack of comprehensive MOC 
process 
 Lack of competency and 






March 4, 1998 
During purging operations, a separation vessel 
failed catastrophically, releasing flammable gas 
which ignited and caused 4 fatalities (including 
3 contractors).  
1. Absence of an inlet valve caused high 
pressure flammable gas to enter from adjacent 
bypass line  
2. Two outlet block valves were closed and the 
high pressure gas could not released 
3. The separator was designed as an 
atmospheric vessel with no overpressure 
protection [5] [6] 
 Lack of a formal engineering 
design review process 
 Improper hazard analysis during 
design and construction phase 
 Lack of adequate pressure relief 
systems 
 No operating procedures for non-




April 23, 2004 
Large quantity of highly flammable vinyl 
chloride monomer was released from a reactor 
and exploded causing 5 fatalities and 2 injuries 
[7].  
1. The reactor groupings had similar lay-out and 
was susceptible to human error.  
2. The manual interlock bypass made provisions 
for unauthorized usage 
 Lack of Human Factors 
consideration in design 
 Lack of safer facility layout 
consideration 
 Failure to learn from past 
incidents 
 






A hydrocarbon vapor cloud explosion occurred 
at the isomerization process unit which was 
being restarted after a maintenance turnaround. 
The blast killed 15 contractors and injured more 
than 170 others. 
 
 Inappropriate design and 
maintenance  
 Inadequate hazard analysis and 
safety measures during non-
routine operations 
 Failure to develop and 
implement corrective actions 
resulting from previous incident 
 Inappropriate placement of 




July 11, 2005 
The semi-submersible oil platform in the Gulf 
of Mexico was found with a 20°–30° list after 
the passage of hurricane Dennis [17]. It was 
primarily caused due to uncontrolled flow of 
water between several ballast tanks. A 
combination of wrong positioning of valves and 
incorrect operational actions caused the event. 
 Inappropriate engineering design 
of ballast valve systems 
 Lack of adequate risk assessment 
during replacement 
 Failure to learn from past 
incidents 








The explosion happened during the production 
of a gasoline additive, where cooling system 
failure resulted in a runaway chemical reaction 
[8] causing 4 fatalities and 32 injuries.  
1. The cooling system was susceptible to single-
point failure due to a lack of design redundancy. 
2. The relief system was incapable of relieving 
increased pressure 
 Failed to recognize the runaway 
reaction hazard 
 Inadequate hazard analysis and 
ALARP  
 Inadequate design of the cooling 







April 20, 2010 
A well control event led to massive hydrocarbon 
leak and resulted in large explosions and fire on 
the Deepwater Horizon rig. The incident caused 
11 fatalities and 17 injuries. Failure in several 
areas caused the catastrophe [9]: 
1. Cement failure 
2. Inadequate negative pressure test and result 
interpretation 
3. Well control action failure 
4. BOP failure 
 Lack of risk assessment after 
changes in well design and 
procedures 
 Poor decision-making  
 Inadequate communication 
within and between operators 
and its contractors 
 Lack of training and supervision 
on critical operations  
Fire Ink Dust 
Explosion and 






A large flash fire and explosion which caused 7 
burn injuries [10] occurred due to: 
1. Accumulation of combustible dust inside a 
poorly designed dust collection system 
2. Dust collection system not designed to 
prevent and control fires 
3. System controls, such as temperature and 
pressure transmitters, were not installed to 
monitor the mixing tanks and dust collection 
system. 
 Lack of comprehensive MOC 
program  
 Inadequate contractor oversight 
during the project 
 Lack of risk and hazard 
assessments before start-up of 
the new dust collection system  
 Failure to develop and 
implement corrective actions 
resulting from previous incident 
Figure 4. Comparison of valve alignments as planned and as found after the incident 
Case Study: Sonat Explosion 
 
To demonstrate the importance of having a sound knowledge of process safety for designing a 
plant/process, we analyzed the catastrophic vessel failure incident mentioned in Table 1. That 
incident happened on March 4, 1998, near Pitkin, Louisiana, at the Temple 22-1 common point 
separation facility owned by Sonat Exploration Company. A separation vessel failed 
catastrophically due to overpressurization which resulted in a fire and killed four people including 
three contractors. As per the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation findings [5], the 
facility was constructed without detailed engineering design reviews and hazard analyses. As a 
result, the risk of vessel overpressurization was ignored and the vessel wasn’t equipped with 




























The facility was designed to receive high-pressure three-phase (crude oil, natural gas, and water) 
stream from the wells. In that facility, there were two separation trains (one test train and another 
larger bulk train). Each train was comprised of three separators connected in series. On the day of 
the incident, Sonat planned to initiate production using the newly constructed bulk train. Before 
start-up, the bulk train and connected pipelines had to be purged to remove the air by using the 
fluid from the wells. Purging is a common practice that helps to decrease the risk of fire by 
removing air. The original plan was to purge the pipelines first then the bulk train. However, the 
order was reversed due to some issues with the well. One hour after purging started, the third-stage 
separator vessel failed and the flammable gas was released and ignited. The fire damaged the 
nearby pipelines. Additional flammable gas was released and ignited which killed four people 
instantly.  
 
Following an incident investigation, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) discovered [5] that 
there was no inlet valve to help isolate the separator vessel from the high-pressure fluid (800 psig). 
Also at that time, valves numbered 1 and 3 (figure 2) were closed which affected the venting 
process. The separator was originally designed to be used as an atmospheric vessel without venting 
valves or any sort of pressure relief system. As a result, the vessel got exposed to high pressure 
stream and failed due to overpressurization. 
 
This incident reflects the vital importance of having process safety competency during engineering 
design. The engineers who were involved in the design phase did not perform necessary hazard 
and consequence analysis for the third-stage separator during the design. The equipment, which 
had the potential to receive high-pressure substances, should have been designed to be isolated 
from the hazards and should have proper pressure relief systems, such as rupture discs. Also, for 
the non-routine operations, such as start-up or purging, there were no written operating procedures 
or training for the workers. A simple hazard/what-if analysis could have identified the vulnerability 
of the designed process. With minimum safety considerations, this type of catastrophe could have 
been avoided.  
 
PROCESS SAFETY IN DESIGN AND PLANT LIFE CYCLE 
 
The early portion of the project/plant life cycle system is essentially the idea generation phase 
where different process routes are pondered, economic viabilities are considered, regulatory issues 
and environmental and safety aspects are assessed. Before materialization of these concepts and 
start of plant construction, the project goes through an exhaustive design life cycle process which 
governs the ultimate performance of the project in terms of safety, reliability, yield and 
profitability. Therefore, the design phases are the most critical phases of a project/plant life cycle 
system. Plant design starts at project conceptual phase and follows a series of stages including pre-
front end engineering and design (Pre-FEED), basic engineering or front end engineering and 
design (FEED), and finally detailed engineering and design.  
 
The concepts of hazards and risks comes into consideration while generating ideas. It is the 
engineering design phases where process safety plays a crucial role. Different phases of project 
and plant life cycle are discussed in Figure 5 along with necessary functional process safety 
elements. It should be noted that, different organization may define and characterize the design 
steps differently based on projects and practices. But the tasks and sequences remain almost similar 
as presented in the flow chart. 
 
  
Feasibility Studies  
 Assessment of feasible options 
o Process philosophy and raw materials requirements 
o Process and utility flow diagram 
o Preliminary list of large equipment and sizing 
 Assess regulatory, licensing and permit requirements 
Conceptual Studies 
 Process and technology studies 
 Determining design philosophy 
 Potential sites identification 
 Process block diagrams 
 Process modeling and flow assurance studies 
 
Pre-FEED (Pre-Front End Engineering and Design) 
 Material, energy balances and process flowsheeting 
 Preliminary P&ID – Issue for Review, Issue for Plant Layout 
 Plot plans & critical equipment layouts 
 Definition and sizing of major equipment and safety devices 
 Blowdown study 
 
FEED (Front End Engineering and Design) 
 Critical review of design philosophies 
 Develop P&ID for approval, HAZOP and design 
 Develop 2D/3D process model 
 Preliminary HAZOP studies 
 Develop engineering design packages and equipment data 
sheets 
 Identifying codes, standards and guidelines for identified 
processes 
Detailed Engineering & Design 
 Materials specification 
 P&ID and hazardous area diagram for construction 
 Detailed equipment/pipeline drawings including isometrics 
 Structural integrity analysis 
 HAZOP studies and reviews 
 Piping stress analysis and design 
 Startup and commissioning procedures 
 
Project Initiation 
Procurement, Construction, Commissioning and Start-up 
Expansion, Modification and De-bottlenecking 
Decommissioning Operations and Maintenance 
Process safety overview: Definitions, business case 
of process safety 
 Management system overview; company system 
& standards 
 Regulatory requirements 
 Inherently safer design concepts 
 Zoning and land use planning 
 Chemical properties – reactivity, toxicity, 
flammability etc.  
 OSHA Recognized And Generally Accepted 
Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) and 
BSEE Best Available and Safest Technologies 
(BAST) considerations 
 High value learning incidents 
 Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) 
 Process Safety Information (PSI) management 
 Hazard Identification (HAZID)/ What-if analysis 
 Making ALARP decisions 
 Barrier management 
 Facility siting 
 Relief sizing 
 Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP) 
 Risk Assessment – Layer of Protection Analysis  
 Consequence analysis & dispersion modeling 
 Fire, explosions and runaway reactions– types, 
causes and prevention 
 Safety Critical Equipment (SCE)/ Bypass 
management 
 Mechanical and structural integrity 
 Management of Change; As-Built vs. As-Design 
MOC 
 Hazardous area classification and zoning 
 Human factors in design 
 Alarm Management 
 Safety Instrumented System (SIS)/ Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) verification 
 Consideration of SIMOPS and concurrent 
activities 
 Designing operating manual and procedure  
 Assessment and verification 
Figure 5. Process safety functional 
elements through a plant design life cycle 
Life Cycle/Typical Project Stages Process Safety Considerations 
At the very beginning, the business case for process safety should be identified and established. 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) have identified four benefits of integrating 
process safety into the business; corporate responsibility, business flexibility, risk reduction and 
sustained value [11]. These four are some of the essential elements for a healthy business practice 
and a robust process safety program helps to achieve these qualities. The next item, inherently 
safer design concepts, is one of the most crucial elements and should be considered throughout the 
design phases. It is very important to incorporate inherently safer considerations at an early stage 
of design as it becomes more and more challenging to make changes in later stages; but not too 
early as a minimum level of process knowledge is required to analyze safer options. Recognized 
and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) and Best Available and Safest 
Technologies (BAST) are tools for identifying and selecting the best practices for the processes in 
consideration. Learnings from past incidents should also be considered during this early phase of 
design.  
 
At the Pre-FEED phase, when preliminary P&IDs are being prepared with plot plans, one of the 
key elements to be considered is the issue of facility siting. Kidam et al. (2012) [12] analyzed 284 
major incidents caused by poor plant layout (17% of root causes). Improper plant layout and close 
proximity of high-occupancy structures are among some of the key findings of Phillips Pasadena 
disaster (1989) which caused 23 fatalities and 314 injuries [13].  A Hazard identification (HAZID) 
needs to be conducted at this phase of engineering design to identify health, safety and 
environmental aspects for further attention. Since the process is finalized and major equipment are 
defined with safety features, consideration of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
concepts in decision making should be understood and practiced. With all these ongoing activities 
it is necessary to develop and maintain a program for managing all the information systematically 
for future use. A comprehensive process safety information (PSI) management system is required 
to record and control all relevant information including chemical properties, process technologies, 
design data, calculations, drawings, and applied codes and standards.  
 
Next, the engineering design process moves to the basic engineering or FEED phase where 
preliminary Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies are conducted to identify and assess major 
hazards from different process upsets. Upon completion of HAZOP studies, a Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) needs to be conducted for better understanding of risk scenarios. Parallel to this, 
it is also necessary to perform consequence analysis to ensure incorporation of required safety 
features to prevent and minimize impacts. Flammability and explosion characteristics of the 
materials and process should also be analyzed carefully and proper fire walls or blast walls need 
to be included in plant layout. Absence of blast walls is considered to be the one of the major 
factors that contributed towards the catastrophic Piper Alpha (1988) incident [14]. Similar to that, 
the severity of many other incidents could have been minimized by carefully examining explosion 
or blast overpressure conditions and designing for safety.  
 
High level process safety topics start to kick in with progression of design phase from basic to 
detailed engineering. Mechanical and structural integrity analysis, hazardous area classification, 
alarm management, safety integrity level (SIL) verification are among some of the key process 
safety functional elements that require attention during detailed engineering stage. The provision 
for safe egress from plant structures, operational and maintenance accessibilities, consideration of 
future concurrent activities or simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) need to be addressed while 
finalizing the equipment layout and skid design. Another critical item in the list is human factors 
consideration in design. This factor should be considered throughout the design process, but in the 
detailed engineering phase maximum attention needs to be put to achieve human-centered design 
philosophies. Human error was predominant in many major incidents including the explosion at 
the Formosa Plastics manufacturing plant (2004), where an inadequately designed safety interlock 
system [7] allowed release of a highly flammable chemical which caused massive explosion and 
fire.  
 
Finally at the end of the design phase, P&IDs are issued for construction after completion of 
detailed HAZOP studies and incorporation of HAZOP action items. This is where the Management 
of Change (MOC) process kicks in. Prior to this point all the design changes were managed through 
engineers’ document control procedures with different revision versions to allow flexibility in 
design process. Changes in design procedure is not as rigorous as MOC and therefore special 
attention needs to be made to ensure all the changes are justified and the changes do not impact 
the safety and integrity of the total system.  
 
The subsequent phases of a plant life cycle are procurement, construction, commissioning and 
start-ups where the key elements that govern process safety performances include but not limited 
to – operating procedures, work permit system, job hazard analysis, emergency management, 
bypass/overrides management, incident investigation, and audit and verification process. Non-
routine operations is another challenging item to be sensibly managed and understood during 
maintenance or revamping activities since majority of the catastrophic incidents occurred during 
these periods. And, for brownfield activities such as expansion or modification of existing plants, 
all above activities are generally applicable to engineering and design phases.  
 
 
ROLES OF CONTRACTORS IN DIFFERENT PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
 
Even though the paper emphasizes the impact of contractors in process safety, it is not only the 
contractors who govern safety performances and practices. Rather it is a shared responsibility of 
the owners and the contractors to take a harmonized approach to ensure safe and reliable 
performance of facilities and process plants. OSHA PSM [15] standards and Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) [16] discuss the responsibilities of the owners and 
the contractors which are generally applicable to the contractors working on construction, 
maintenance or similar activities. Some typical responsibilities of the owners include ensuring 
contractor training and knowledge in process safety, sharing necessary process safety information 
and enforcing safety rules and standards in related activities. Contractors need to ensure that they 
follow the safety rules set in the contracts, build process safety competency among their workforce 
and work in accordance with owners for safe completion of project jobs. Generally these roles and 
responsibilities are managed by the owners through a Contractor Health, Safety and Environmental 
Management program. Each company has its own contractor management policy and programs 
with detailed information on contractor engagement and management process.  
 
The roles of the design contractors are totally different from the maintenance and the construction 
teams and it is very important yet challenging to establish specific responsibilities of different 
parties to integrate process safety in design practices. A brief discussion is presented in this section 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the owners and the contractors and how should they 
effectively interact. Rather than individual responsibilities, the owners and the contractors should 
be partnered in achieving safety goals and high class performances. So the roles of the contractors 
are discussed here in conjunction with the roles of the owners and their interfaces. 
 
a. The owners should clearly identify and define process safety requirements and their business 
values; the requirements should be mutually agreed upon the contracts and the contractors 
should understand their roles and responsibilities to establish the requirements. 
 
b. The owners and the contractors should work together to create a guideline on integrating 
process safety during engineering design phases. To achieve this, design engineers should have 
a sound understanding of the different aspects of process safety discussed in the earlier section. 
A competency matrix similar to Table 2 can be developed to identify essential functional 
process safety elements specific to design phases. Engineers and technical personnel from both 
the owner and the contractor companies can go through certain learning programs to have a 
common baseline of process safety knowledge. 
 
c. The owners and the contractors should have a harmonized approach to determine best practices 
and process safety standards. The contractors should be responsible for the choices they make 
during designing a process and the owners need to make sure all the safety expectations are 
fulfilled prior to start of construction and start-up. In the case of near-capsizing of 
Thunderhorse production-drilling-quarters (2005), three non-return valves of ballast tank 
system were mounted in a wrong position which in combination with some malfunctions 
caused uncontrolled flow of water among ballast tanks [17]. Later the problems were fixed 
without further damage but this incident clearly shows the importance of having an interactive 
approach between the owners and the contractors throughout the project life cycle. 
 
d. Focus should be made on effective transfer of the process safety information and design 
documents. A clear, well-defined communication protocol needs to be established for effective 
flow of information. The contractors should have a systematic document control process in 
place and all the control documents need to be transferred to owner’s document management 
system. The contractors should assess the impact of any changes they make during design; 
especially after finalizing design philosophies and process technologies. All the changes 
should be justified with clear rationale and documented for future reference. 
 
Thus from an owner’s perspective, it is necessary to focus on building awareness and competency 
in process safety for their partners in projects. And the contractors should cooperate to establish 
an industry-wide understanding on process safety fundamentals so that different stakeholders can 
have healthy interactions to achieve common goals. In the next section some existing practices for 
building process safety competency along with improvement opportunities are discussed.  
  


























































































































































x x x x x x x x x x 
Design for Safety x x x x x    x  
Hazard 
Analysis/HAZOP 
  x x x  x  x  
Risk Assessment and 
ALARP 
 x x x x    x  
Best Practices for 
Contractor Management 
& Process Safety 
 x    x x  x x 
High Value Learning 
Incidents 
x x x x x   x x x 
Life Cycle Analysis 
(LCA) 
x x x      x  
Human Factors in 
Design 
    x    x  
Facility Siting & Land 
Use Planning 
 x x x x    x  
MOC     x x  x x x 
SIMOPS     x  x x x  
Mechanical Integrity    x x   x x  




  x x x  x x x x 
Incident Investigation      x x x x x 
SIS/SIL    x x   x x  
Operating Procedure - 
Design & Discipline 
    x x x x x x 
Work Permit System      x x x x x 
Alarm Management     x  x x x  
Bypass/Override 
Management 
    x  x x x  
ORR/PSSR       x  x  
Assessment and 
Verification 
    x x x x x x 
Non-routine Operations      x x  x x 
Emergency Management     x x x x x x 
Hazardous Waste 
Management 
       x x x 
 
 
PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Existing Practices and Programs for Contractors 
 
‘Contractors’ is one of the fourteen elements of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) 
Guidelines [15] which explicitly states that the employers who use contractors to perform work 
such as design, maintenance, repair, turnaround, major renovation, or any specialty work in and 
around processes that involve highly hazardous chemicals have to establish a screening process so 
that they hire and use only the contractors who accomplish the desired job tasks without 
compromising the safety and health of any personnel at a facility. For contractors whose safety 
performance on the job is not known to the hiring employer, the employer must obtain information 
on injury and illness rates or experiences and should obtain contractor references. These standards 
often only state “what to do” not “how to do it” [18]. The screening processes that OSHA has 
referred to are best in the interest of both the operators and contractor’s safety; however, often the 
process gets complicated as there are no single standards or guidelines that can be used as a 
reference by either parties.  Many operators and contractors have similar opinion as that of Lovell 
and Hill [19]. They referred to the fact that the organizations have to rely on trust that the 
contractors are fully competent without having a high level of control over that assurance. Any 
Competency Management System (CMS) must include a reasonable level of contractor 
competency assurance; however, not having detailed information on the course content or 
guidelines makes them difficult to know the level of competency. Despite having contractor 
management systems by various organizations’, the incidents keep happening. Short Contractor 
Safety Management (CSM) courses are offered by various institutions [20]. In most of the cases 
the process safety management overview course is offered with few specific topics. However, there 
is no comprehensive course package that one could take to increase the competency of an 
employee.  
  
Of many work performed by the contractors, the design work is one of the most crucial works for 
the operators as the initial design has lifelong impact on plant safety. Considering process safety 
in design phases prevents expensive retrofitting and rework to correct hazardous conditions in 
latter phases. Hence, the objective is to provide enough safety knowledge to the design contractors 
which would help them to decide on how to recognize and anticipate the design hazards and 
identify ways to eliminate them with well thought out design features. However, there is no 
particular standard or required competency program available to do so.  
 
Improvement Opportunities in Competency Development 
 
The literature research and discussion with the operators and the contractors indicated the need for 
a comprehensive program to properly addresses the existing challenges and provide a roadmap in 
improving the contractor competency. For example, various industries have their own Process 
Safety Competency Matrix as that of Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). IChemE Safety 
Centre (ISC) published a guidance, “Process Safety Competency – a Model 2015” [21].  They 
provided various organizational roles with specific area and description of their job duties. Then 
to establish a competency framework they determined the topics of competency.  Twenty-one 
topics were defined as requiring specific process safety competency based on various guidelines. 
These topics were then mapped against the six functional elements of safety which are 1) 
knowledge and competence, 2) engineering and design, 3) systems and procedures, 4) assurance, 
5) human factors, and 6) culture. Then the competency was defined across 4-tier scale (awareness; 
basic application; skilled application and proficiency; and mastery or expert) to capture the 
competency requirement in varied workforce. ISC also indicated how the management of 
contractors fit in with the six elements of process safety [22]. For each of these elements some 
specific questions were raised that could help the operators to better evaluate the contractors.   
 
Though there have been some work done to improve contractors’ competency in process safety, 
there is still significant room remains for improvement. There is a certain need for a dedicated 
process safety program for the EPC design contractors to provide them with a baseline of 





The project of developing contractors’ competency in process safety was initiated by Shell 
partnering with Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) at Texas A&M University. 
Soon after Chevron and other major operators, contractors and manufacturing companies 
supported the idea of developing process safety competency programs focusing on the design 
engineers. Through joint industrial partners, MKOPSC started its outreach program to identify the 
gaps and potential training topics specific to EPC contractors.  Through an interactive session with 
14 participating companies, the team agreed on 18 essential process safety topics. The main goal 
of this program was identified as to ensure a baseline of understanding about process safety across 
the industry. The scope of the project was determined as designing learning programs for EPC 
design contractors to build global competency on process safety. 
 
The next step was to group the 18 identified topics into potential learning programs. Six learning 
programs were finalized along with major contents which are discussed below – 
 
1. Process Safety Overview: Establish a global set of process safety terminologies, develop 
understanding on major accident hazards and share the business cases of process safety  
2. Design for Safety: Establish a common understanding of Inherently Safer Design (ISD), 
RAGAGEP and BAST concepts; design for normal/emergency/non-routine scenarios and 
develop barrier management concepts 
3. Risk Management & ALARP: Establish hazards and risk perspective in decision making, 
introduction to risk assessment tools and consequence analysis techniques, provide a common 
definition of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) and discuss risk acceptance 
practices 
4. Best Practices for Contractor Management & Process Safety: Establish expectations for 
identifying and mitigating risks collaboratively, sharing high value learning incidents and 
discuss competency assurance practices 
5. Human Factors: Apply human factors thought processes to design decisions, discuss the 
concept of human-centered design and provide an overview of common behavioral traps 
(confirmation bias, normalization of deviation) 
  
6. Common Issues/Core Practices to Support Process Safety: Develop understanding on high 
level process safety topics, for example, management of change (MOC), facility siting, 
simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), safety critical equipment (SCE), process safety 
information (PSI) management and others 
 
Now the existing materials are being modified for EPC-design application, with the objective to 
review with a much larger group. The comments and feedback received will then be incorporated 
to design a sample program that would contain appropriate content and delivery methods. Similar 





The criticality and significance of contractors’ roles throughout the process life cycle are discussed 
in this article. It is also demonstrated that the design life cycle process governs the ultimate 
performance of the process plant in terms of safety and reliability in the future. Significant number 
of incidents have indicated the critical need for programs that covers the entire life cycle of the 
projects and which will be adopted by the operators/owners and the contractors. However, existing 
programs are not comprehensive enough to meet the needs of the both parties. Hence, it is 
important to establish an extensive learning program accepted and driven by both the owners and 
the contractors. Current initiative is the first step towards achieving the goal of global competency 
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